Soviet Urban Transit Planning

Soviet urban transport planning was driven by a set of goals, based on the larger ideological goals of Soviet planning in general. Paul White listed these as follows (8–9)

As can be seen, the priorities were rationally-derived, with an eye towards efficiency and a lack of excess. But they also reflect a well-grounded understanding of the problems in Soviet transport. Long commute times, often as long as ninety minutes in each direction, was foremost among these, and the focus of much effort, though the massive urban growth in this period mostly seems to have negated these efforts. Further, the somewhat-crude designs used for transit equipment led to excessive needs for maintenance, leaving as much as twenty-five percent of transit fleets out of service at any one time. All of this was compounded by the excess traffic and poor coordination between different ministries and governmental agencies; this tended to lead to poor use of land and other environmental problems, and poor safety, especially in road transit. (White 13–15)

Therefore, the Soviet planning establishment undertook a number of general projects to attempt to remedy these shortcomings in transit. They focused on increasing the speed of transit (hence the focus on metros and tramways where possible), modernizing surface transit (mainly using higher-capacity vehicles to reduce traffic), and streamlining transfers between different modes of urban transport. Further, they aimed to use land more efficiently, particularly in terms of better placement of garages for private vehicles. (White 15–22)

These aims led to the development of medium- and long-term plans, typically for 10–15 and 25–30 years, respectively, aiming to maximize productivity and efficiency. For example, they typically located workplaces and residences near transportation lines these, however, were subject to modification to fit the current Five Year Plan, often causing shortsighted decisions that undermined the long-term goals, along with the necessary compromises between municipal, republic, and Union authorities. (Morton 180–185)

Accordingly, especially in the earlier Soviet period, urban transit (and transport in general) were often seen as lagging behind other industrial developments. Early on, Molotov acknowledged that transport was the “weakest factor in our [Soviet] economic system.” (Stalin 59) However, planners seemed content to blame transport workers for the problems encountered, failing to perceive managerial and organizational shortcomings (Stalin 187–189) Perhaps this was at least in part because idealistic thinking about transit abounded: Kaganovich identified the Moscow Metro, for example, as an embodiment of the “new Soviet man.” He admitted that the workers were inexperienced, but held that the power of the proletariat to transform itself would overcome technical hurdles. (Stalin 429–436) The failure to do so, therefore, indicated the failure of the ideological transformation of reality that the Communist Party strove to create.